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Abstract 
For several decades, the German automotive industry has been under mounting 
pressure to reorganize its production processes and its modes of value-chain 
governance. In this paper, we analyze the effects this restructuring has had on the 
economic development of the Central and Eastern European countries that have 
specialized in automotive production during the capitalist transition. We focus on two 
global market forces: the standardization of the production of electric engines and the 
changing patterns of international trade regulation, mostly under the German neo-
mercantilist trade regime. Our hypothesis is that structures of dependent development 
are reproduced by the forms of vertical specialization that have emerged in the 
automotive industry in these countries. To prove this, we combine the theory of global 
value chains with Vernon’s product life-cycle theory. 
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Most studies analyzing Central and Eastern Europe’s economic dependence 
concentrate exclusively on interstate economic relations. And while world-system 
scholars have traced the core-periphery relationship to different nodes of the world 
economy, including regional and inter-firm levels, the intrinsic linkages between these 
various levels and the mechanisms through which the multiscale system operates 
continue to be underexplored. The methodological aim of our paper is to establish a 
clear set of links between the global and local levels of the international division of labor 
and the regional, inter-firm, and intra-firm levels of production in order to examine the 
question of dependency from the broadest possible perspective. By exploring the links 
between these different levels of the system, we intend to describe the ways in which 
macro-structural dependencies are produced and reproduced by interfirm relationships 
within the production process. Our emphasis highlights those structural dependencies 
in which capitalist fractions accommodate themselves to world economic forces by 
relocating production, restructuring value-chain governance, and instrumentalizing 
state regulation, among other methods. While dependency scholars have emphasized 
the dialectical relationship between structure and agency on the state level, our analysis 
puts the emphasis elsewhere—on the connections between and among the various 
macro- and micro-structural levels of the system—in hopes of better understanding the 
evolution of economic dependencies. 
In this paper we suggest a new methodological approach to economic dependency. 
The theory of dependency is nothing new; it dates back to the interwar and immediate 
post-war developmental concepts of scholars in Latin American and certain Western 
and Eastern European countries (Prebisch 1950; Cardoso 1972; Furtado 1976; Gereffi 
and Evans 1981; Love 1990; Becker and Weissenbacher 2015; Weissenbacher 2017). 
More recently, scholars in the tradition of Critical Political Economy have introduced the 
concept of the dependent market economy, which combines the notion of dependency 
with analyses of the role of the state in different varieties of capitalism (Bohle and 
Greskovits 2012; Drahokoupil 2009; Vliegenthart 2010; Nölke 2016; Becker 2016; Raviv 
2008). Proponents of the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach have thoroughly studied the 
expanding role of foreign manufacturers in Central and Eastern Europe (Šćepanović 
2013; Bernaciak 2011), while other institutionalists—for instance, analysts of regulation 
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such as those of GERPISA—have focused more on ‘work models’ and institutional 
compromises in the automotive industry (Freyssenet and Lung 1996; Boyer and 
Freyssenet 2002; Krzywdzinski 2008). 
Unlike institutionalists’ models of the ‘varieties of capitalism,’ structural Marxists’ 
analyses have long emphasized the uneven and combined development exhibited by the 
‘new international division of labor’ (Fröbel et al. 1981). They have argued that the rise 
of transnational corporations (TNCs) has created conditions akin to those originally 
described by classical dependency scholars, conditions which world-systems scholars 
have referred to as typical of the semi-periphery (Wallerstein 1976; Chase-Dunn 1998). 
Marxist political economists’ studies have also focused on geopolitical phenomena such 
as the decline of US hegemony resulting from the profitability crisis of manufacturing in 
the US (Arrighi and Silver 1999; Brenner 2006; Roberts 2016). World-systems scholars 
have also emphasized the illusory benefits of industrial development on the Southern 
periphery, arguing that technological transformation plays a pivotal role in the 
reproduction of core-periphery relationships (Arrighi 1990). 
Our analysis is based on a notion of uneven and combined development which 
resembles these structuralists’ concepts. We want to understand how certain forms of 
vertical specialization in a global value chain contribute to the reproduction of core-
periphery relationships. Core-periphery relationships originate in the uneven global 
distribution of capital and technology (Chase-Dunn 1998). We define the semi-periphery 
as an interrelational position in the world system where capital and technology are 
relatively scarce in comparison to the core. We have previously analyzed various forms 
of external financing—loans, foreign direct investment, and transfers—and the roles 
such capital has played in Eastern Europe’s historically dependent development (Gerőcs 
and Pinkasz 2018). In this paper, we seek to elaborate further on the role technology has 
played in the standardization of production processes, and to examine questions of 
ownership, which we consider more problematic in semi-peripheral countries than in 
core economies. Thus the crucial questions facing us in this analysis are, ‘Who controls 
the capital and technology necessary for advancements in production?’ and ‘Who has 
access to the most advanced technologies?’ 
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We use Vernon’s product life-cycle theory (1966) in order to establish connections 
between hierarchical patterns of interfirm relations and the hierarchies of the 
international division of labor in which they are embedded. Vernon’s concept explains 
how variations in companies’ capacities for innovation are both caused by and result 
from the uneven distribution of technology within the sphere of production. The theory 
of standardization demonstrates how the introduction of innovative technologies 
devalues existing production processes by diminishing their capacity for creating value. 
Such devaluation affects not only production processes, but also forms of labor 
organization and the rates of return on older technologies still in operation. 
The emphasis on devaluation helps us to avoid focusing solely on incorporation 
processes. Effects of disconnections and disinvestment in commodity chains are also in 
the focus of the analysis (cf. the concept of disarticulation by Werner and Bair 2011). 
Notions of standardization which emphasize technological devaluation are in conflict 
with the concept of technological upgrading generally embraced by global value-chain 
scholars. According to Vernon’s theory, the constant pressure of devaluation means that 
transfers of technology do not automatically result in upgraded production processes. 
Even switching a production line over to a new model can accelerate the life cycle of the 
given product and push it into decline—a process which tends to be ignored by 
proponents of the theory of upgrading. The latter concentrate on one particular segment 
of the production process or on one particular model, the transfer of which they 
understand as a dynamic improvement in the technological endowments of the given 
production facility3. The advantage of Vernon’s theory is that it encompasses both 
technological shifts and the reorganization of entire production processes, including 
spatial relocation and the reproduction of geographical hierarchies within the division of 
labor. Thus, it combines macro- and micro-level analyses. One disadvantage of this 
theory is that it was initially applied only to US-based firms, and thus generally neglects 
questions of ownership. We have therefore modified Vernon’s product life-cycle theory 
by incorporating it into a framework including Global Value Chain (GVC) and Global 
Production Network (GPN) theories (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Gereffi et al. 2005; 
                                                 
3 According to Humphrey and Schmitz (2004) captive networks in the value chain provide favorable 
conditions for process and product upgrading but hinder functional upgrading in semi-peripheral 
countries. 
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Henderson et al. 2002; Coe et al. 2008; Gereffi 2014). GPN scholars have broadened their 
framework to include labor, regulation, and even class in their analyses of power 
relations inside and outside interfirm networks (Liu and Dicken 2006; Pavlínek et al. 
2009; Sturgeon and Van Biesebroeck 2011; Sheppard 2012; Domański et al. 2013; Smith 
2015). In our framework, the links between Vernon’s theory and the GVC/GPN 
approaches are the different forms of economic rent which various players extract over 
the course of a product’s life cycle. 
We have also modified another aspect of Vernon’s theory in incorporating it into our 
approach. Given the advancing integration of international trade and the subsequent 
fragmentation of traditional Fordist production lines in industrial economies (Feenstra 
1998), the structure of the international division of labor has changed significantly since 
Vernon formulated his theory in the 1960s. This theoretical approach—combining 
Vernon’s concepts with the GVC/GPN framework—helps us analyze the hierarchical 
structures of the new international division of labor at the level of suppliers’ inter- and 
intra-firm relations. The GVC approach is, however, inappropriate for analyzing 
dependencies on a global scale. Even some early critics of this theory pointed out that it 
focuses narrowly on business analysis (Bair 2005) and largely omits broader social 
contexts, despite the aims of the original Global Commodity Chain (GCC) approach out of 
which GVC theory developed (Smith et al. 2002; Henderson et al. 2002). GPN theorists’ 
important contribution to analyses of global dependencies is their focus on the 
ownership structure of the supply chain; GVC/GPN approaches are also useful for 
analyzing modes of organizing labor and the relationships between production and 
regulation; in applying GVC and GPN theories, we also incorporate Vernon’s notions 
about the role of technology in the production process. As we noted above, the weakness 
of the theory of upgrading espoused by GVC/GPN scholars is that it neglects the uneven 
and contradictory effects new technologies have on the production process as a whole. 
We have used this synthetic approach—including elements of the GVC/GPN 
frameworks and Vernon’s product life-cycle theory—to examine the automotive 
industry in Central and Eastern Europe because international car assemblers have been 
expanding their production capacity there. This expansion of the car industry—mainly 
but not exclusively by German firms—has been one of the strongest drivers of the 
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economic integration of the V4 countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
Hungary) into wider European production networks, i.e., into the European division of 
labor. 
The significance of the automotive industry is demonstrated by both the growing 
shares of the V4 economies in European automotive production, and by this industry’s 
share in these countries’ industrial output, export sales, employment, and revenue 
figures (Pavlínek 2015; Barta 2012; Sass and Szalavetz 2014) (Figure 1). Since the early 
2000s, automotive TNCs have been forced by dire market conditions to reorganize the 
governance structures of their expanding value chains and to standardize some of their 
production processes (Humphrey 2000; Sturgeon and Florida 2000). The aim of our 
research is to show how the core-periphery relationship between Germany and the V4 
countries has been reproduced by a process of vertical specialization during recent 
expansions of German automotive value chains. In the following paper, we identify two 
processes which determine the forms of this vertical specialization: first, the unfolding 
technological transformation – the shift from combustion to electric engines – that is 
behind the relocation of production from Germany to the V4 countries; and second, the 
formation of a new regional trade regime based on Germany’s neo-mercantilist model. 
 
Figure 1 Car production in Central and Eastern Europe, 1989–2018 
 
 
Source: OICA, Pavlínek, 2015: 212. 
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The remainder of this paper consists of five sections. The first is a brief historical 
overview of the evolution of different automotive value chains with a focus on the 
formation of the various governance structures within the emerging regional trade 
regimes. In section two, we revisit the theory of global value chains—augmented by 
Vernon’s product life-cycle theory—in order to analyze the life cycles of two substitute 
products, combustion and electric engines. We hope to demonstrate a relationship 
between technological transformation and the geographical relocation of some 
segments of production. In section three, we highlight the effects of relocation on 
production and the modes of labor organization inside the value chain. The core-
periphery relationship manifests itself in differing modes of labor organization: product 
development in production centers in Germany is marked by the ‘high-road work 
model,’ while specialization in the standardized segments of production in the V4 
countries is characterized by the ‘low-road work model.’ In section four, we explain why 
the German neo-mercantilist model is important to our understanding of this core-
periphery relationship. And finally, in our concluding remarks, we highlight how 
regional dependencies are reproduced by new forms of vertical specialization in the 
automotive value chain. 
 
1. Governance structures in the US, Japanese, and German automotive value 
chains 
After the Second World War, industrial production in the capitalist world economy 
was concentrated in three core regions: the United States in North America, Japan in 
East Asia, and West Germany in Western Europe. Till the end of the 1960s, the United 
States was a clear economic hegemon with a vast domestic market representing almost 
half of global purchasing power. Due to the expansion of productive capacities in 
Germany and Japan, the global overcapacity crisis began to affect the automotive 
industry as early as the 1970s (Sturgeon and Florida 2000). Up to that point, expanding 
international trade had been a positive-sum game, but the crisis suddenly turned it into 
a zero- or even negative-sum game (Arrighi et al. 2003). Deteriorating market conditions 
forced governments to push the growing costs of unfavorable trade relations back on 
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each other. Overcapacity resulted in a profitability crisis which put leading automotive 
companies under growing pressure to adjust to an increasingly competitive market 
environment. Their strategic efforts included restructuring earlier forms of production 
with the help of new forms of interfirm governance and technological innovation; these 
companies also simultaneously asserted their influence over various governments and 
administrative bodies in an effort to produce favorable trade regulations. 
The political efforts to implement trade restrictions4 did very little to restore 
profitability (Brenner 2006: 153). Protectionism did, however, inspire reactions from 
the competitors. The internationalization of the industry accelerated in the 1980s, but 
emerging automotive value chains retained a regional profile under the slowly 
diminishing domination of core markets (Freyssenet and Lung 1996; Boyer and 
Freyssenet 2002). The term ‘globalization’ is misleading. The industry was instead 
marked by the regionalization of production systems, with newly emerging vertical 
specializations deepening the competition among the major industrial hubs. Regional 
trade regimes emerged around the old industrial centers (Humphrey and Memedovic 
2003). These regimes, such as NAFTA, the EU, and ASEAN, can be seen as the 
consequences of intensified regulatory competition. 
Despite similar patterns in their reorganizations of production and trade regulation, 
we can distinguish the governance structures of the regional value chains (Gereffi et al. 
2005);5 the differences between them reflect the original market positions of the 
American, Japanese, and German TNCs. In case of the United States, assemblers have 
been expanding their global presence since the 1980s by attempting to create a ‘world 
car’6 through which to improve their economies of scale. Japanese OEMs’ outsourcing 
strategies targeted trade expansion instead of reorganizing production, for which they 
needed to comply with local regulations (e.g., local content requirements). 
                                                 
4 As early as 1974, the US introduced the Trade Reform Act, which included protectionist policies aimed at 
stabilizing the US’ position in the world economy (Cardoso and Faletto 1979). In May 1981, in order to 
combat dumping on the US’ domestic market, ameliorate the resulting recession in the American car 
industry, and restore the industry’s profit margins, the Reagan administration introduced the so-called 
‘voluntary export restraint’ (VER) program. 
5 OEMs are the brand-managing, lead firms in global automotive value chains; their supply chains are 
divided into tier-1 (sometimes called system-integrator), tier-2, and tier-3 participants. 
6 Ford used to be the most internationalized US producer. It launched the ‘2000 Program,’ a major 
reorganization of its global operations designed to manage excess capacity and produce a variety of 
models from common platforms (Bartlett and Seleny 1998: 324). 
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The German automotive value chains developed similarities to both its US and 
Japanese counterparts (Humphrey and Memedovic 2003; Pavlínek and Janák 2007). It is 
not only the governance structure that is peculiar to the German automotive value chain, 
but also the highly advanced trade regime that developed around it in the form of 
European integration. The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the German 
automotive value chain co-evolved within the German neo-mercantilist model (Becker et 
al. 2015). This model is understood here to mean that the EMU was structured in 
accordance with Germany’s trade interests, which have historically centered around the 
uninterrupted accumulation of current-account surpluses. The most advanced form of 
such trade regulation was the implementation of the single currency and the European 
Single Market in the early 1990s. The euro was relatively undervalued in comparison 
with Germany’s economic strength, which encouraged German TNCs to expand into less 
developed satellite markets in the EU in accordance with the fundamentals of the neo-
mercantilist model.7 
The creation of the EMU, however, only temporarily delayed the automotive market 
saturation brought on by Germany’s aggressive, neo-mercantilist strategy of export-
expansion. In the 1990s, German automotive TNCs took advantage of monetary 
integration, but in less than a decade they reached the limits of regional market 
integration. As a result, by the early 2000s, the geographical destination of Germany’s 
automotive exports gradually shifted from EU to non-EU markets, especially to China 
(Figure 2). This geographical shift in export destinations has been catalyzed by the 
recent worldwide financial crisis; the resulting global-market conditions have also 
forced changes in the German neo-mercantilist model. 
                                                 
7In Southern Europe, for instance, local producers trapped in the monetary union could not cope with the 
new competition; having adopted the new single currency, their governments also lost the ability to 
devalue, making it increasingly difficult for them to withstand this mounting external pressure (López 
and Rodríguez 2011; Gambarotto and Solari 2015). 
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Figure 2 German total gross trade, share, 1999 and 2018 
 
Source: Comext (International Trade / EU Trade Since 1988 By CN8). 
 
For V4, the period after the collapse of Comecon was distinguished by rapid 
specialization in the newly expanding regional automotive industry,8 induced by the 
relocation processes taking place inside the expanding German automotive value chains. 
Consequently, the V4 region became part of the spine of the German neo-mercantilist 
model. However, this geographical relocation of production from Germany to the 
Visegrád region was driven not only by the new realities of global trade relations, but 
also, significantly, by a technological transformation unfolding in the automotive 
industry. This reorganization of the automotive value chain would have serious 
consequences for the form and degree of vertical specialization in V4 countries; in the 
following section, we analyze the technological forces behind such relocations in order 
to better understand how the core-periphery relationship between Germany and V4 is 
reproduced by various types of vertical specialization in the expanding automotive value 
chain. 
 
                                                 
8 See Czaban and Henderson (2003). 
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2. The relationship between the relocation of industrial production and the 
product life cycles of electric and combustion engines 
In order to understand the effects that vertical specialization in the German 
automotive value chains have had on V4 countries, we need to look at the forces behind 
industrial relocation. When profit prospects for combustion engines became bleak in the 
1990s, standardized mass production was transferred to new geographical locations. 
Another major impetus has been the standardization of the production of electric 
engines, which has helped push the combustion engine further into the mature phase of 
its life cycle. V4 countries’ vertical specialization in the German automotive value chains 
targets the production of the latter engine type, and therefore the position these 
economies occupy is increasingly limited to the lower end of the value chain. 
As an analytical starting point, we combine Vernon’s product life-cycle theory 
(Vernon 1966) with the GVC/GPN framework. This helps us connect the different stages 
of product development to the changing profit conditions created by the process of 
standardization. In each stage of product development, companies seek new strategies 
to extract various forms of rent from the value-creation process (Henderson et al. 2002: 
448-449; Kaplinsky 1998). At the end of this section, we will extend Vernon’s single-
product model to a two-product model to explain the historical relationship between the 
standardization of electric-engine production for cars and the geographical relocation of 
the standardized production of combustion engines; though Vernon focused on the 
perspective of a core country, his theory is applicable to both core and peripheral 
economies. 
In the first stage of Vernon’s single-product model, when a new product is introduced 
commercially, the market price has less to do with initial production costs than with the 
monopoly position that the pioneering producer has achieved in its market niche. 
During the early phase of product development, companies are better able to afford high 
expenditures on innovations because their costs can be covered by this monopoly rent. 
In the second stage, when new competitors enter the market, the standardization of 
production processes transforms the type of rent to be extracted. Monopoly rents 
evaporate as escalating competition puts downward pressure on both prices and profits. 
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In this stage, production costs tend to determine prices. In order to sustain their rates of 
profit, companies must find technologically innovative ways to standardize their 
production processes. Their rents are almost directly associated with the degree of 
standardization they achieve. Any advances in its processes of standardization will allow 
a company to reap extra benefits without changing prices—at least until their innovative 
technologies are emulated by competitors. This source of profit, technological rent, 
cannot be sustained over the long run if competition intensifies.  
During the standardized stage of production, profits come under increasing pressure 
and price competition will ultimately regulate the market. When standardization cannot 
be intensified at the same speed with which competition is accelerating, the material 
costs of production, including raw materials and labor, become the most important 
arenas for price competition. In this sort of competitive environment, companies are 
encouraged to seek new strategies, such as geographical relocations of the standardized 
segments of their production processes. This leads to the final stage of the product life 
cycle, in which a third type of rent arises from strategies like geographical relocation. 
We call this exploitative rent. 
Nevertheless, product development and the geographical division of production are 
not necessarily directly related to core-periphery relationships. Before they are 
integrated into standardized production systems, important technological innovations 
are fostered in various locations irrespective of the host country’s position in the 
international division of labor. In fact, domestic start-ups and garage firms all over the 
world conduct some of the most important technological experiments in the early stages 
of product development. A new division of labor emerges as production is adapted to 
standardized production systems. In addition, the geographical extension of production 
accelerates as larger multinationals acquire such technologies and integrate them into 
their established production networks. 
The structural hierarchy of production, therefore, crystallizes only when a product’s 
development reaches the final stage. It is only when standardized production is 
relocated to a new geographical region that companies are able to generate exploitative 
rents. The more standardized the production process of a given product becomes, the 
more likely its production is to be relocated to the periphery. Thus the hierarchical, 
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core-periphery structure of a production process crystallizes not at the beginning of a 
product’s life cycle, but as the culmination of its standardization. 
In the following, we expand Vernon’s one-product model to cover two substitute 
products. Even in the case of a single product in the standardized stage, its price cannot 
drop at a continuous rate if improvements in the scale efficiency of its production slow 
down. Thus, despite continuous downward pressure on prices, the speed at which they 
fall decreases over time. Thus for two substitute products, each of which may be in a 
different stage of its life cycle, the price process described above results in a price 
convergence which accelerates over the long run. Therefore, at a later stage of 
development, the competition between the two substitute products will intensify. 
For incumbent companies facing growing price competition in a market for substitute 
products, this raises two questions. First, to which product will the company allocate 
more of its limited investment and development funds? And second, how will it 
reorganize the production process for the product with bleaker prospects for 
technological rents in the more standardized phase of its life cycle? The mechanism 
through which the two substitute products’ life cycles interact in a price competition is 
the allocation of investment funds, which follows the shifts from one form of rent to 
another. More funds tend to be allocated to the less-mature product with higher 
expected returns on technological investments, leaving less capital to be put into the 
standardized product with the declining rate of return. In both cases, we see an 
acceleration of such interaction processes. The more funds are allocated to a product in 
the process of standardization, the faster its standardization proceeds. At the same time, 
as less capital remains to be invested in the standardized product, the faster such a 
product tends to decline into the final stage of its life cycle. For the less-mature product, 
this process will bring an acceleration of its standardization, while the product already 
in the standardized stage will move rapidly toward a market exit. In the latter case, 
companies can still slow down this exit process, and thus minimize their losses on 
previous investments by pushing down material costs and seeking exploitative rents 
through strategies like geographical relocation, as described above. 
In case of the geographical relocation of the German automotive industry, we find an 
underlying interaction between the life cycles of the combustion engine, which is in its 
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standardized phase, and the electric engine, which is now in the process of rapid 
standardization. We assume that the combustion engine originally had a stronger and 
more direct influence on companies’ investment strategies than did the development of 
the electric engine. The direction of influence, however, has changed over time. As the 
standardization of the less mature electric engine proceeds, while the more 
standardized combustion engine moves toward ‘over-maturity,’ with very little room for 
further development,9 investment has begun to shift toward the former. The electric 
engine, as it enters its more standardized phase, tends to attract more and more of a 
company’s limited investment funds, effectively drawing them away from the 
combustion engine. We can see the evolution of the cost and energy density of electric 
batteries in Figure 3; the average cost of an electric battery tends to fall as its efficiency 
gradually increases. 
Figure 3 Electric battery cost and battery energy density 
 
Source: Comext (International Trade / EU Trade Since 1988 By CN8). 
 
Even though electric cars have only recently become available commercially, the early 
stages of their product life cycle stretch back to the 1920s, just after the revolutionary 
innovation of the moving assembly line, which Henry Ford first installed in 1913. The 
initial stage of the electric car’s life cycle lingered on for almost a century because the 
                                                 
9 VW Group CEO Matthias Müller, who was appointed after the diesel scandal, made a telling remark in 
observing that diesel engines are going to disappear over time. 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/industrie/vw-und-dieselgate-mueller-sieht-nur-die-
fehler-der-anderen/14472000.html 
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prospects for its development were determined by the life cycle of the combustion 
engine or Otto motor. Despite the existence of several prototypes, none of these electric 
models reached the stage of standardized production,10 largely because of Ford’s 
revolutionary innovations in the production of combustion engines a decade earlier. The 
rapid standardization of the Ford model attracted a great deal of investment, kick-
starting a boom in the life cycle of the Otto motor. It took less than a decade for this 
model to conquer the US and world markets, and even today, the widespread 
standardization of electric models is still largely dependent on the evolution of the Otto 
motor’s life cycle. In other words, the standardization of electric-car production will 
speed up when the life cycle of the Otto motor approaches its end. Although this process 
has begun to accelerate since the oil-price shocks of the 1970s (at which point the Otto 
motor reached the stage of maturity), there is still a long road ahead (Figure 4). 
Figure 4 Market share of fuel types for newly registered cars in the EU, 2011–2014 
 
Source: own collection based on ACEA, BMI database. 
 
The world economic crisis of 2009 seems to have accelerated the movement of the 
combustion engine into the declining phase of its life cycle. One consequence has been 
that companies in the German automotive value chain have accelerated the relocation of 
                                                 
10 Several attempts have been made to develop plug-in electric and hybrid cars, most of which have failed 
to gain adequate market share. See the examples of Tucker in the 1940s, DeLorean in the 1970s, and 
Fisker Automotive in the 2000s. Interestingly, Fisker had to suspend production after its main battery 
supplier went bankrupt in 2012. http://www.economist.com/news/business/21695012-tesla-
becomes-more-regular-carmaker-it-faces-bumpier-ride-charge 
- 16 - 
Tamás Gerőcs - András Pinkasz /Central and Eastern Europe’s dependent development 
in German automotive value chains 
 
their production to V4 in hopes of generating exploitative rents. Returns on 
technological investments—those aimed at super-standardization and efficiency gains, 
especially in the downsizing of diesel engines—have dropped to historically low levels. 
As a result, returns on investments aimed at improving electric cars’ efficiency tend to 
threaten companies that lag behind in this technological transformation.11 We assume 
that the standardization of the mass production of electric engines has been underway 
since the aftermath of the 2009 crisis.12 However, because of the influence investments 
in electric and combustion engines have on each other, OEMs’ attempts to continue 
generating returns on their investments in the sinking combustion segment create 
strong tailwinds for relocation.13 Some of these investments might still turn a profit if 
production is relocated to regions where value can be created by generating exploitative 
rents. The global semi-periphery – including Central and Eastern Europe – is the best 
possible choice for expanding the production of standardized models that are moving 
toward the ends of their life cycles because of the low cost of material inputs there, most 
notably cheap labor. 
 
3. Core-periphery relations in the German automotive value chain 
As a result of vertical specialization in the German automotive industry, both the 
share of V4 in global automotive production (Table 1) and that industry’s share in those 
economies’ manufacturing output (Figure 1), export sales, FDI stocks, and employment 
figures have been climbing steadily since the middle of the 1990s (Pavlínek 2015: 212). 
As we have demonstrated in section two, this relocation process has been driven largely 
by the accelerating standardization of electric-engine production and the consequent 
                                                 
11 A global survey conducted by KPMG found that a majority of responding managers of OEMs in the US, 
EU, and Japan had shifted their investment priorities away from the efficiency gains of downsizing 
combustion engines and started allocating more funds to innovation in electric and hybrid fuel systems 
(KPMG 2015: 17). 
12 The emergence of Tesla’s Model 3 and the growing number of technological innovations introduced by 
traditional OEMs—such as Renault-Nissan’s Leaf, BMW’s i3, and GM’s Chevrolet Bolt—provide evidence 
for an increasingly intense interaction between the life cycles of the two substitute engines. Major 
German OEMs have lagged behind in this transformation, possibly as a result of the more traditional 
governance structure of their value chains. Very recently, however, both Daimler and VW have launched 
massive, multi-billion-dollar initiatives in hopes of catching up in this fiercely competitive race. See, for 
instance, Daimler’s ‘Ecolux project’ and VW’s ‘Together-Strategy 2025.’ 
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shift of the combustion engine—the production of which V4 has specialized in—into the 
declining stage of its life cycle. In this section, we analyze how automotive-industry 
relocation has affected the core-periphery relationship between Germany and V4 in the 
following three areas: labor productivity and capital intensity; modes of labor 
organization; and opportunities for capturing value in the context of local property 
relations and interfirm governance structures (Henderson et al. 2002: 449). 
Table 1 Share of CEE in global automotive manufacturing 
 
  
Number of vehicles 
produced 
Share of countries in CEE and global 
automobile manufacturing 
1000 units CEE=100% Global=100% Global=100% 
2000 2018 2000 2018 2000 2018 
Germany 5 525 5 120 81,2% 61,3% 9,5% 7,0% 
Czech 
Republic 456 1 345 6,7% 16,1% 0,8% 1,8% 
Poland 505 452 7,4% 5,4% 0,9% 0,6% 
Slovakia 182 1 009 2,7% 12,1% 0,3% 1,4% 
Hungary 137 431 2,0% 5,2% 0,2% 0,6% 
Aggregate 6 805 8 357 100,0% 100,0% 11,7% 11,4% 
Global 
Aggregate 58 374 73 457 
  
100,0% 0,0% 
 Source: OICA database. 
 
Labor productivity and capital intensity 
To understand the hierarchical nature of the German automotive industry, we need to 
analyze labor productivity and capital intensity in various phases of the production 
process (Figure 5). For this purpose, we use world-systems scholars’ definition of the 
core-periphery relationship: ‘a continuous variable between constellations of economic 
activities which vary in terms of their average relative levels of capital intensity versus 
labor intensity’ (Chase-Dunn 1998: 207). Capital intensity means a high level of 
investment in non-standardized, i.e., relatively monopolistic spheres of production that 
usually erect barriers to prevent competitors from entering the market. Thus, high 
capital intensity also means monopoly rents and a relatively high proportion of skilled 
workers. On the other end of the theoretical spectrum, we find more standardized 
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activities with declining productivity rates and a relatively larger share of unskilled 
labor, which we regard as the labor-intensive segment of the market. It is important to 
note that the terms of this analytical dichotomy cannot be used to describe any 
particular activity over a long period of time as the profile of any of such activity is prone 
to change due to the process of standardization. What we regard as a capital-intensive 
activity with high labor productivity on the day a product is introduced will soon be 
transformed into a more standardized, labor-intensive activity. 
 
Figure 5 Labor productivity (GVA/employment) in the automotive industry  
in Germany and CEE (thousand euro) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
We turn our focus to the German automotive value chains to identify aspects of a 
core-periphery relationship among the various activities in the production process. In 
the German center of production, specialization occurs in new product development and 
other capital-intensive activities, e.g., producing special machine tools in the service of 
mass production (Krzywdzinski 2014: 6). The production of such machinery requires a 
relatively large proportion of highly qualified workers for whom there is competition in 
the labor market. It is more difficult to relocate skilled labor and – according to Beblavý 
- 19 - 
Tamás Gerőcs - András Pinkasz /Central and Eastern Europe’s dependent development 
in German automotive value chains 
 
et al. (2012: 28) – that is the reason for the continued concentration of basic R&D 
activities in core areas. Technological innovation associated with product development 
is usually also retained in the headquarters under the strict control of OEMs and tier-1 
firms’ global operations. The R&D activities relocated to the Visegrád countries, on the 
other hand, assure that local suppliers will be able to keep up with the uninterrupted 
flow of technological adaptations.14 Central and Eastern European countries serve as an 
‘adopter region’ in the platform based production in which competencies are developed 
by the transfer of technologies from the core (ibid). Moreover, available information on 
export portfolios also suggests that none of the Visegrád countries have specialized in 
the production of goods and activities associated with new products’ development or 
trade linkages to the ‘upstream’ segment of the value chain. 
Indeed, most of the activity recorded as R&D is supporting production of 
standardized components in assembly plants which Beblavý et al. (2012) calls 
incremental innovation. Pavlínek (2012) argues similarly, that it is not basic research 
which would be in charge of developing completely new type of motors, e.g. electric or 
hybrid engines. Instead, as is also stressed by the IMF (2013: 3), a large proportion of 
foreign value-added content in a country’s total volume of exports indicates that it is a 
‘downstream’ participant in the supply chain, usually specializing in processing and 
assembly functions.15 In short, there have been no major innovations in the automotive 
industry in the region, but incremental changes and product adaptations conducted by 
companies’ headquarters are registered as R&D. 
                                                 
14 These adjustments are necessitated by periodical model upgrades in already established lines of 
production. One recent example is the transfer of Audi’s Q3 model to the Hungarian VW-plant in Győr 
between 2016 and 2018. Four models were previously assembled there: the TT Coupe, TT Roadster, A3 
Limousine, and Cabrio. These models became outdated as they reached the midpoint of a medium-sized 
car’s average life cycle, which industry experts estimate at 6 years. After a model reaches middle age, its 
sales tend to drop, a process catalyzed for some of these vehicles by the 2015 diesel scandal.  
http://www.portfolio.hu/vallalatok/autoipar/decembertol_atmenetileg_kevesebb_autot_gyart_a_gyori_
audi.235412.html 
15 Advanced economies tend to be upstream in the supply chain, using relatively limited quantities of 
foreign value-added content in their exports. Upstream segments manage intangible activities like 
marketing and design (IMF, 2013). 
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Figure 6 Domestic value added (DVA) and gross export in the automotive industry 
in CEE and Germany, 2005-2015 
 
 
Source: TiVA. 
 
Although the modes of vertical specialization in CEE differ somewhat, the overall 
tendency toward a stagnant environment—one which produces little growth in value 
added in car production—applies to the countries under investigation here. We argue 
that there is no clear link between the growth of the automotive industry in CEE 
economies and improvements in their capacity to increase the share of value added. In 
fact, an inverse relationship seemed to apply before the world economic crisis. Prior to 
2008 the share of domestic value added (DVA) produced by local enterprises slowly 
decreased and could only be compensated for by larger volumes of output.16 Between 
2005 and 2007, the share of domestic value added in gross automotive export dropped 
by 4 percentage points in the Visegrád countries, despite the tendency to show increases 
in nominal export volumes. After the crisis in 2008 the share of DVA rose sharply due 
not to increasing value added but the sudden and hectic drop of gross export figures 
(Figure 6). We assume that the value added production adjusted slower to the crisis 
                                                 
16 The gross value added share in the automotive industrial output is extremely low in the V4 countries 
because of the strong import demand in the production. One notable example is Hungary where the 
production of one additional unit of gross value added in the automotive industry generates 3.22 
additional units in the country’s total import (Kazimir et al. 2016: 10). 
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than gross export as workers and wages could not be reduced at the same pace with the 
sudden drop in exports. There has been no adequate data to show a clear tendency since 
the end of the crisis, but diminishing share of DVA in the gross automotive export seems 
to have resumed once again after 2010 (Gerőcs and Pinkasz 2019). The region’s increase 
in foreign value added is related to the growth of German value added in both nominal 
and relative terms (IMF 2013: 11). In the case of Germany, CEE represents the bulk of 
the growing share of foreign value added in the automotive export. As Cieślik has noted, 
the V4 countries’ relatively large share of foreign value added in the automotive export 
indicates a low position in the value chain, i.e., with respect to downstream market 
segments (Cieślik 2014). 
More thorough statistics highlight the fact that such specialization does not always 
result in complementarities; the overall trend suggests an incoherently integrated intra-
regional division of labor. Export statistics on product portfolios differentiate between 
two forms of specialization: supplying intermediate goods and assembling final goods 
(Molnár 2012; Kopint 2011). Incoherence arises as a result of parallel and competing 
activities that depend on commands from German headquarters.17 Vertical 
specializations involve activities in which Germany exports intermediate goods to be 
processed in downstream facilities in V4, then re-exported directly or indirectly to the 
rest of the world (IMF 2013: 12). In Slovakia, for example, semi-final assembly 
dominates automotive export activity, whereas in the Czech Republic there is a more 
balanced combination of final-product assembly and the supplying of parts (Beblavý et 
al. 2012: 8-9). Interestingly, the supply of important intermediate goods for further 
processing elsewhere seems to dominate the Hungarian and Polish export portfolios 
(Ambroziak 2016: 36). 
Because the process of standardization induces relocation, one of the most important 
export products of V4 automotive industries is the combustion engine (diesel and 
gasoline). The VW group, the biggest automotive investor in all the Visegrád countries, 
had already relocated much of the production of these engines to V4 even before the 
diesel scandal began to haunt it, which suggests that the combustion engine has been in 
                                                 
17Parallel production of the same components in several plants creates opportunities for management to 
play production locations against each other (Pulignano 2007, cited Krzywdzinski 2014: 5). 
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the final phase of its life cycle for some time. The restructuring of the production process 
induced by this scandal and the consequent relocation of various models provide further 
evidence of this type of vertical specialization. According to Krzywdzinski (2008), the 
direct relocation of production has not resulted in an East-West division of labor, but 
rather in the renegotiation of product allocation to various European sites, which 
usually takes place with each new generation of products. In 2016, Audi (part of the VW 
group) decided to outfit its Brussels plant for the production of electric cars and transfer 
its older A1 models from Belgium to the Martorell plant in Spain. Audi’s Q3 model, 
formerly produced at the Spanish factory, was then transferred to Győr, Hungary as a 
part of the process of model upgrades described above. Groupe PSA’s Opel division 
(former General Motors), the only other manufacturer of engines in Hungary, also 
recently upgraded its motor fabrication plant in Szentgotthárd.18 Figure 7 shows the 
increase in engine production at Audi’s and Opel’s Hungarian plants. Audi’s plant in Győr 
was in 2015 the single biggest engine factory in the world. 
Figure 7 Engine production in Hungary, 1992–2018 (per 1000 unit) 
 
Source: own collection based on company reports. 
                                                 
18Győr is the largest combustion-engine facility in the VW Group; it provides engines for all the brands in 
VW Group, including Škoda, Seat, Audi, and Porsche. Audi Hungária Zrt. produced more than 2 million 
engines in 2015, making it the single biggest engine factory in the world. Between 2014 and 2016, Opel’s 
Flex factory in Szentgotthárd expanded its engine production to 600,000 units. 
http://www.hrportal.hu/c/2016-ra-lesz-teljes-az-uzem-szentgotthardon-20130609.html 
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Similar restructuring has occurred in Daimler’s Mercedes division. The core factory in 
Bremen has been dedicated to the future production of electric cars, whereas the 
production of older models of compact (B-class) and sub-compact cars is being relocated 
to its newly built engine plant in Jawor, Poland and its expanded body plant in 
Kecskemét, Hungary.19 The VW Group has yet to make a final decision about the 
specialization of its global factories, but as of late 2017, company managers in Germany 
have hinted, after negotiating a massive lay-off with labor unions, that the electric 
engines and batteries will be developed in the Kassel and Braunschweig factories, 
respectively (Dudenhöffer 2016). 
 
Modes of labor organization  
Modes of labor organization are determined by the exploitative rents which can be 
siphoned off from peripheral to core sites. One notable result of relocation is that wages 
tend to lag behind labor productivity (Krzywdzinski 2008: 14; Cieślik 2014; Drahokoupil 
and Piasna 2016) (Figure 8). The source of exploitative rent is thus the constant gap 
between wages and productivity in the German automotive value chain. Profit 
consolidation presupposes this gap and results in sharply contrasting modes of labor 
organization in Germany and in V4. This core-periphery relationship produces forms of 
labor organization that industrial sociologists call ‘high-road’ and ‘low-road’ work 
models (Pyke and Sengenberger 1992, cited Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2008, 2014). 
Despite higher unit labor costs, the high-road model in Germany benefits from cutting-
edge technological innovations that help it to sustain high levels of productivity (Jürgens 
and Meissner 2005: 15). In addition, the protection of this model—which in many cases 
enjoys the support of trade unions—includes concessions in which lower-paying, lower-
quality work is relocated to lower-wage countries. All in all, wages and the resultant 
purchasing power remain higher in Germany than in those countries trapped in the low-
                                                 
19 Mercedes management has decided to expand and renovate its Kecskemét facility by 2020. This 
overhaul will equip the factory to assemble bodies for ‘alternative cars’ as well, in case management 
decides in the future to transfer the production of its current models abroad—a decision made likely by 
the process of standardization. 
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road model, where their types of vertical specialization result in much lower levels of 
unionization. 
Figure 8 Gap between productivity and unit labor costs in the automotive industry 
in CEE countries (average) compared to Germany (100%) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
The relative size of the highly skilled, white-collar workforce employed in what we 
call capital-intensive activities20 depends not only on continuously increasing numbers 
of skilled laborers, but also on declining numbers of unskilled workers. The latter has 
been a long-term trend in the German auto industry as a whole, and this process has 
accelerated considerably since the 2000s as a result of increasing relocation 
(Krzywdzinski 2008: 23). The more certain segments of production become 
standardized, the more blue-collar workers employed in those activities become 
exposed to relocation. As Krzywdzinski has demonstrated with regard to the supplier 
segment, labor-intensive mass production with relatively low skill requirements has 
almost completely disappeared from Germany; the standardized production of spare 
parts and components has also been affected by relocation. The recent drop in the 
number of blue-collar workers has contributed to a re-structuring of the whole German 
                                                 
20 ‘The increase in the number of highly skilled employees would indicate an increasing specialization in 
complex high-quality products and on human-capital-intensive parts of the value chain.’ (Krzywdzinski 
2008: 22). 
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workforce.21 Losses caused by relocation have been counterbalanced by successful 
specialization in premium, high-tech, and high-quality products (Krzywdzinski 2014: 
15). One consequence is that the bargaining power and wages of blue-collar workers 
have been constantly undermined in comparison with the improving position of more 
advanced skilled workers, which state of affairs several authors have dubbed the 
‘dualism’ of the German automotive workforce or the segmentation of the employment 
structure.22 
Labor-market conditions for un- or semi-skilled labor in V4 are already marked by 
intense competition and insecurity. The labor market consists of flexible fixed-term 
contractors, a largely non-unionized labor force, and temporary agency workers23 who 
can be easily integrated into production lines during reorganizations and model 
upgrades and whose employment is thus the most sensitive to the business cycles 
(Meszmann 2016; Gerőcs et al., 2019; Drahokoupil and Piasna 2018). Job security is 
generally limited to a thin stratum of the workforce. Interestingly, jobs in the automotive 
industry are not even among the top three highest-paying forms of employment in 
Hungarian manufacturing (Figure 9), one reason for which, industry experts suspect, is 
the relatively large share of unqualified, semi-skilled workers employed by auto 
manufacturers. Average wages have also been pulled down by the growing number of 
underpaid young interns whose employment is supervised by the so-called dual-
vocational school system, originally based on the German model of apprenticeship 
training (cf. Fichter et al. 2005). The growing share of such interns curbs wage demands 
even when there is a growing need for semiskilled workers.24 
                                                 
21 ‘The stability of employment in the German automotive industry during the first half of the current 
decade conceals a fundamental change in the employment structure: a loss of blue-collar jobs and a gain 
of white-collar jobs.’ (Krzywdzinski 2008). Low-skill production with no educational requirements—e.g., 
the assembly of wire-harness systems and the simple, high-volume production of automobile seats—
was the first to be removed from Germany to low-wage countries (Krzywdzinski 2014). 
22 The so-called ‘vertical disintegration’ of the German automotive industry and its labor relations implies 
the increasing use of insecure forms of employment such as agency work for non-core employees and an 
emerging dichotomy between core and non-core employees. In expanding their deployment of agency 
workers, automotive companies have caused segmentation in their employment conditions, 
differentiating between secure, well-paid and insecure, low-wage workers (Bernaciak 2011; Bernaciak 
and Šćepanović 2010; Krzywdzinski 2014). 
23Volkswagen’s share of temporary agency workers, for instance, is about 10-20% of its V4 workforce, 
compared to an average of 2% at its German sites (Krzywdzinski 2008: 13).  
24 Strikes and boycotts in the V4 automotive industry are extremely rare. They have happened on two 
interesting occasions, however, both of which were caused by labor shortages resulting from industrial 
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Figure 9 Average monthly gross salaries in different Hungarian industries (Euro), 2018 
 
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Hungarian Central Bank. 
Different modes of vertical specialization give rise to differences in the allocation of 
technologically advanced activities among the Visegrád countries, which in turn affect 
some aspects of labor organization, e.g., the type of labor required for a given task. 
Simple assembly usually needs more semiskilled labor and less advanced technology 
than the production of sophisticated parts like engines. The latter requires more 
technological investment, fewer workers (however skilled), and in many cases, high 
levels of technologically advanced automation. These differences, however, do not mean 
that specialization in more technologically automated activities will create better 
conditions for value capture. On the contrary, in comparing the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, we see that labor-intensive manufacturing—to which several local 
supplementary activities are attached—has achieved better embeddedness in the local 
economy due to its greater reliance on diverse sources of local labor inputs,25 including 
highly qualified engineers, which it employs at greater rates than do the mobile 
                                                                                                                                                        
mass migration. One such example occurred at the VW facility in Poland in the early 2000s, the other at 
the Hungarian Mercedes plant in Kecskemét in the autumn of 2016. In both cases, management refused 
workers’ wage demands despite exhaustive negotiations and mounting pressure to improve labor 
relations. 
25 The biggest Czech auto manufacturer, the formerly state-owned Škoda Automobilova, was purchased by 
the VW Group in 1991. During the privatization process, the Czech government insisted on local-content 
requirements and protections for a vast network of local suppliers, which terms VW agreed to in the 
privatization contract. See Bartlett and Seleny for differences between VW’s brownfield investments in 
the Czech Republic and its greenfield investments in Hungary (1998: 329). 
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technological enclaves used for standardized and automatized production with much 
lower local content (Bartlett and Seleny 1998; Sadler and Swain 1994). This might 
explain why domestic value added in the Czech automotive export has grown in contrast 
to other V4 economies. 
 
Value capture 
Vertical specialization circumscribes a firm’s ability to capture value in the 
automotive value chain. According to Henderson et al., ‘it is one thing for value to be 
created and enhanced in given locations, but it may be quite another for it to be captured 
for the benefit of those locations’ (Henderson et al. 2002: 449). The possibility of value 
capture in a local context is determined by property relations and the value chain’s 
governance structure. 
Assessing property relations involves analyzing the number and strength of TNCs vis-
á-vis domestic firms both inside the value chain and in a local economy. The property 
structures of the V4 automotive industry are characterized by a surprisingly high level 
of concentration, which has tended to grow over time (Kopint-Tárki 2008). Foreign 
corporations with a global presence dominate the value-chain hierarchy from the top 
level—lead firms or OEMs—down to the mid-bottom of tier-2.26 Companies with 
significant domestic ownership of operations above tier-2 are very rare in the Visegrád 
countries. In fact, the share of domestic suppliers is decreasing even among tier-3 firms 
in some of the countries under consideration. In Hungary, for instance, the Hungarian 
Central Statistical Office’s database shows that the number of domestic companies in the 
automotive industry decreased from 98 to 63 between 1998 and 2015. Similar trends 
are at work in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. As Pavlínek (2015) has shown, this 
declining share of domestic suppliers in the value chain has had a significant impact on 
overall economic development. TNCs in the Czech and Slovakian automotive industries 
                                                 
26 In Hungary, for instance, around 90% of the assets in the industry are foreign owned (Kopint-Tárki 
2008: 48). 
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have reacted differently to the economic downturn, responding with different 
employment policies and making much greater use of profit repatriation.27 
The governance structure of the German automotive value chain reflects the 
hierarchies inherent in vertical specialization. The profitability crisis in the automotive 
industry has forced lead firms at the top of the value chain to delegate tasks and 
competencies that have been devalued as a result of standardization, and thus the 
possibility of capturing value has changed accordingly. Companies at lower levels in the 
chain face growing costs because new competencies have been delegated to them. 
Companies that are unable to perform these new tasks lose their positions in the chain 
and are forced either to leave the market or to re-position themselves at lower levels. 
Profits are thus distributed unevenly over the length of the value chain. 
Tier-3 firms have suffered most from the profitability crisis. On the one hand, tier-3 
companies tend to improve their capabilities by developing financial and technological 
dependencies on their higher-level partners (Pavlínek and Janák 2007). On the other 
hand, growing costs and intensifying competition have made value capture more and 
more difficult; the resulting pressure has forced many tier-3 companies to exit the 
market, which has contributed to the growing concentration of foreign ownership in 
local property structures. The governance structure at the lower levels of the value chain 
has become captive and hierarchical, with rigid dependencies and growing price 
competition caused by lead firms’ strong control over suppliers (Beblavý et al. 2012: 
10). The effects of this pressure, such as low profitability and difficulties in capturing 
value, have not been distributed evenly, even among tier-3 companies. In the captive 
structure, foreign TNCs and their domestic suppliers are affected differently. Despite 
growing pressure, TNCs can still generate exploitative rents. Domestic suppliers, who 
are typically trapped at tier-3, have limited access to technological innovations and 
financial resources, and therefore remain financially more dependent on their higher-
level partners to cover the costs of the technological and labor investments they will 
                                                 
27 TNCs’ strategies for generating exploitative rents affect peripheral locations in two particular ways. 
First, value is transferred to the core through profit repatriation and other techniques, including transit 
pricing, purchases of intellectual property rights, and accounting operations (UNECE 2015). Secondly, 
profits can be reinvested locally in order to extend or modify production. Classical ‘dependencia’ 
scholars underline the fact that local authorities cannot easily influence any of the above-mentioned 
alternatives (Gereffi and Evans 1981).  
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need to make in order to master new competencies, carry out new tasks, and capture 
value (Kopint-Tárki 2008: 49). When competition intensifies, they face a greater risk of 
bankruptcy. The head of the Association of the Hungarian Automotive Industry has 
expressed concern that domestic suppliers have ‘almost no chance of becoming tier 
ones.’28  
 
4. The position of V4 in the German neo-mercantilist model 
As we noted in section one, if we wish to understand how the structures of dependent 
development in V4 are reproduced by these production processes, it is important to 
expand the scope of this analysis from vertical specialization in the German automotive 
industry to include the European trade regime, and we therefore turn our focus to 
Germany’s neo-mercantilist model. The sine qua non of this model is the sustainability of 
Germany’s current-account surplus (Figure 10). This surplus has increased considerably 
since the implementation of the euro and the accession of the new member states, 
despite the fact that German companies have been increasingly challenged by growing 
competition inside and outside of Europe. However, since European markets have 
reached their saturation point, the geographical destination of Germany’s exports has 
begun to shift from the EU to non-European markets, especially to China (see Figure 2). 
                                                 
28István Pintér, president of the Association of the Hungarian Automotive Industry (MAGE) and CEO of the 
largest Hungarian tier-2 supplier, Rába Járműipari Holding Nyrt. (a majority stake in which is held by the 
state), has also mentioned the overcapacity of the European automotive industry and the need for 
downsizing: http://autopro.hu/gyartok/Pinter-Istvan-strukturalis-munkaerohiany-van-a-
jarmuiparban/7066/ 
In a panel dedicated to Hungarian SMEs in April 2016, company representatives shared their bleak 
experiences with competency struggles. http://gepjarmuipar.hu/english/ahai/ 
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Figure 10 Germany’s current-account balance (% of GDP), 1971–2017 
 
Source: The World Bank. 
Despite the fact that the German neo-mercantilist model has had various and diverse 
effects on the V4 economies, we will continue to focus on trade as it relates to the 
automotive industry. German corporations’ relocation to the geographical proximity of 
Visegrád countries has helped them to keep production costs in check, an important 
tactic for withstanding the pressure from growing global price competition. V4’s share of 
German trade has grown significantly since the late 1990s, despite Germany’s overall 
trend of de-Europeanization. On the one hand, shifting the geographical destinations of 
German exports to sustain current-account surpluses has been largely limited to trade in 
finished products. On the other hand, however, the shift to V4 primarily affected its 
trade in intermediate goods. Due to this reorientation of trade relations, Germany is 
currently accumulating fairly significant trade deficits with V4 (Figure 11) which, 
according to the OECD database, are caused by the growing share of foreign value-added 
content in German exports.29 However, the exploitative rents derived from the 
                                                 
29 Between 1995 and 2011, the share of foreign value added in German exports increased to 37%, 
compared to 11% in the US and a global average of 28%. Germany’s export re-orientation has had a 
direct impact on the composition of intra-European trade as well. Prior to the crisis, it was dominated by 
the distribution of final goods (either durable consumer goods or investment products); since 2009, 
intermediate inputs have achieved a dominant share of such trade (Kopint 2011). 
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relocation of production and the growing demand from non-European markets have 
helped Germany maintain its massive current-account surpluses.  
Figure 11 Trade balance with Germany in V4 (gross trade vs. trade in value added) 
million dollars 
 
 
Source: TiVA. 
Surprisingly, despite these processes, Germany’s share of V4 exports has been 
decreasing for some time, according to gross-trade statistics (Figure 12). In contrast, 
there has been a spectacular upsurge in China’s share of V4 exports, as well as 
significant growth in intra-regional trade. These developments have made up for the 
declines in the German share of V4 countries’ exports. Considering that China’s growing 
share of V4 exports includes an increasing volume of intermediate goods, and that V4 
domestic suppliers have been losing their positions in the value chain, we presume that 
China’s rise as a destination for V4 exports is related to the increasing activity of German 
companies in that country. Thus, in reality, the rise of China has further intensified V4’s 
trade-dependence on Germany. Germany not only accounts for a dominant share of the 
V4 countries’ trade, but, contrary to what we see in the gross trade statistics, German 
companies’ share of the V4 countries’ exports has continued to increase, which is at least 
partly due to the influence of the automotive industry. One notable illustration is 
Hungary; Eurostat data suggest that around 20% of its annual exports to China between 
2012 and 2015 consisted of shipments of combustion engines. These engines are 
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produced and then re-exported for further processing inside the value chains of VW’s 
Audi and GM’s Opel. There is a similar logic behind the trend toward increased volumes 
of intra-regional trade. In reality, this rising volume of cross-border trade activity is the 
result of complementarities in the vertical specialization of the German automotive 
value chains which boost intra-regional shipments—as we saw, for example, in case of 
the cooperation between Mercedes’ engine and body plants in Poland and Hungary. 
Figure 12 V4 average total gross trade, share, 1999 (first) and 2018 (second) 
 
Source: Comext. 
What is remarkable in these gross trade statistics is not only V4’s increasing 
dependency on German trade, which has continued to rise despite the decline of 
Germany’s share in the gross statistics. A surprising asymmetry also appears when we 
compare gross trade data with value-added statistics based on OECD TiVA tables (Figure 
11). Despite the fact that in gross terms (as shown above), V4 countries produce 
surprisingly high trade surpluses vis-á-vis Germany, value-added statistics show 
something remarkably different. In Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Poland, these 
surpluses drop significantly, whereas Hungary had deficit in gross trade and in value-
added terms both in 2005 and in 2015; this might be attributable to the relatively large 
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share of engine production in V4 exports, since the production of such technologically 
sensitive components requires significant imports of value-added content. 
The asymmetric trade relations described above emerged within the European trade 
regime, and thus we assume that the regulatory framework of the EU will continue to 
serve the changing needs of the German neo-mercantilist model. Germany’s current-
account surplus is now primarily the result of global trade, and thus the protection of the 
European Single Market benefits German industrial exporters less than it used to. 
Nevertheless, market protection per se has not lost its appeal; the EU’s regulatory 
framework is now shifting toward the protection of its expanding value chains. This 
tendency might lead to the emergence of new mega-regional trade regimes driven by the 
global ambitions of TNCs (Yoshimatsu 2002). We expect the German neo-mercantilist 
model to continue to develop as it is integrated into a future Transatlantic trade 
regime30 which will intensify V4’s vertical specialization as part of its automotive value 
chains. From V4’s perspective, the overall process will simply reproduce its patterns of 
dependent development in the context of a new trade regime. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have analyzed uneven and combined development in the automotive 
industry by focusing on the emergence of core-periphery relationships in the production 
processes between Germany and the V4 countries. For the purpose of this structural 
analysis we needed to address a new methodological aspect of economic dependencies. 
We combined the macro level of the international division of labor to the micro sphere 
of production when we applied the framework of GVC/GPN together with Vernon’s 
product life-cycle theory.  
We have highlighted with our empirical query that the major force behind V4’s 
vertical specialization in the German automotive value chain has been the unfolding 
technological transformation in the production of automotive engines. The 
                                                 
30 Mega-regional trade regimes—such as the TTIP in the Transatlantic region and the TPP in the Pacific 
region—were expected to come into being in near future (Juutinen and Käkönen 2016), though their 
prospects have become very bleak as a result of massive changes in the political landscapes of some 
key participants including the United States. 
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standardization of electric engines and batteries, along with the subsequent over-
maturity of the combustion engine—the production of which V4 countries have 
specialized in—has provided a framework for the core-periphery relationship apparent 
in these production processes. This relationship has had notable consequences for labor 
productivity and capital intensity, modes of labor organization, and methods of 
capturing value. 
Beyond the production process, asymmetrical trade relations dominated by German 
neo-mercantilist trade interests have further enhanced the core-periphery relationship 
between Germany and V4. While automotive manufacturing depends more and more on 
export destinations outside the EU, and overall trade dependency in the industry 
continues to increase, the costs and benefits of such trade relations are distributed 
unevenly along the value chain and among the local economies it comprises. Much of the 
value of these automotive export surpluses is produced in Germany, while the value 
created by the labor-intensive segments of the chain in Visegrád countries are siphoned 
off in the form of exploitative rents, which more than compensate for the accompanying 
trade deficits accumulated in Germany. As a result, Germany’s current-account 
surplus—the basis of its neo-mercantilist model—has grown almost continuously over 
the last 15 years (see figure 10). 
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